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CLOSURE PROVISIONS IN MDL SETTLEMENTS 
D. Theodore Rave* 
 
Closure has value in mass litigation.  Defendants often insist on it as a 
condition of settlement, and plaintiffs who can deliver it may be able to 
command a premium.  But in multidistrict litigation (MDL), which currently 
makes up over one-third of the federal docket, closure depends on 
individual claimants deciding to participate in a global settlement.  
Accordingly, MDL settlement designers often include terms designed to 
encourage claimants to opt in to the settlement and discourage them from 
continuing to litigate.  Some of these terms have been criticized as unduly 
coercive and as benefiting the negotiating parties—the defendant and the 
lead lawyers for the plaintiffs—at claimants’ expense.  But closure 
strategies vary widely and operate on claimants in complex ways.  This 
Article examines closure provisions in recent publicly available MDL 
settlements.  It creates a taxonomy of closure strategies, exploring how they 
work to ensure claimant participation and how they affect claimant choice 
and welfare.  And it closes with a call for MDL judges to take a more active 
role in supervising and evaluating the terms of global settlements in MDLs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Peace has value in mass litigation.1  Indeed, securing sufficient closure is 
often critical to making settlement possible.  And the procedural vehicle 
that has come to dominate the mass litigation landscape—multidistrict 
litigation, or MDL—provides a fertile environment for global settlement of 
the defendant’s liability to potentially thousands of claimants.2  In MDL, 
similar cases in federal courts all over the country are transferred to a single 
district judge for consolidated pretrial proceedings with the plan that they 
will eventually be sent back to their original courts for trial.3  But that 
almost never happens, as the goal (and typical endgame) of MDL is, and 
has always been, to achieve global resolution.4 
In MDL, peace depends on individual claimants deciding to participate in 
a global settlement.  Unlike the more familiar class action, where absent 
class members can be bound to a settlement if they do not opt out,5 an MDL 
consists of plaintiffs who have hired lawyers and filed their own lawsuits.  
And those suits generally cannot be settled en masse unless the claimants 
affirmatively opt into the deal. 
So when crafting a global settlement, the negotiating parties—typically 
the defendant and the lawyers appointed by the MDL judge to the plaintiffs’ 
steering committee (PSC)—have to find ways to ensure that enough 
 
 1. See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 
66 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (2013). 
 2. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation If 
a Class Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2223 (2008). 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). 
 4. See Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”:  The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 
1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 55), http://law.seattleu.edu/ 
Documents/CivProWorkshop/Bradt_MDL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZBM-TPMP]. 
 5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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claimants participate in whatever alternative procedure they have set up to 
resolve claims.6  MDL settlements thus often include terms designed to 
encourage claimants to opt into the settlement and discourage them from 
continuing to litigate.  These closure provisions range from walk-away 
participation thresholds below which the defendant can back out of the deal 
to bonus payments as the number of claimants participating approaches 100 
percent to requirements that participating lawyers recommend settling to all 
of their clients and withdraw from representing those who refuse. 
The risk that MDL settlements can include terms that benefit the 
negotiating parties more than claimants is well recognized.7  Indeed, a 
central feature of MDL is the complex principal-agent problem it presents.  
Although, as a formal matter, each claimant has hired a lawyer and filed an 
individual lawsuit, claimants who are sucked into an MDL have little actual 
control over the litigation; lawyers on the PSC make the important 
decisions.8  And in settlement negotiations, the PSC’s interests may align 
more with the defendant’s in getting a deal done than with the claimants’ 
interests in maximizing individual recoveries.  The PSC might thus be 
tempted to offer the defendant finality at claimants’ expense.  But the ever-
present risk of agent disloyalty does not necessarily mean that global 
settlements emerging from MDLs are bad deals.  Closure may be what the 
defendant demands in exchange for compensation, and claimants who can 
deliver it may be able to command a premium for doing so.  The real trick 
is in telling the difference, and that is no easy feat. 
A first step toward being able to evaluate the fairness of closure 
provisions in MDL settlements is to understand how they work.  Because 
they tend to strongly encourage claimants to accept the deal and provide 
opportunities for defendants to back out if too few do, it can be tempting to 
think that closure provisions generally benefit defendants at claimants’ 
expense.9  But closure strategies operate in different ways with different 
effects on claimants’ choices and welfare.  Some closure provisions can be 
quite coercive, leaving claimants vulnerable to sweetheart deals that foist 
inadequate settlements on them while handsomely rewarding the PSC with 
 
 6. Cf. D. Theodore Rave, Settlement, ADR, and Class Action Superiority, 5 J. TORT L. 
91 (2014) (arguing that settlements in mass litigation are a form of alternative dispute 
resolution). 
 7. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 
VAND. L. REV. 67 (2016); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat 
Players in Multidistrict Litigation:  The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 
2017) (manuscript at 5–6), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2724637 [https://perma.cc/XRK5-
LWDB]; Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 KAN. L. 
REV. 979 (2010); Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 
96 CORNELL L. REV. 265 (2011). 
 8. See Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict 
Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1986 (2011). 
 9. See, e.g., Burch & Williams, supra note 7, at 5 (“All of the examined settlements 
featured at least one provision that encouraged closure and finality (which benefits the 
defendant), and nearly all settlements contained some provision that increased lead 
plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fees.”); see also Burch, supra note 7, at 143–44 (effectively equating 
automatic-enrollment provisions with higher walk-away thresholds and lawyer-
recommendation provisions). 
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common benefit fees.  But other closure provisions may be useful tools for 
claimants to credibly offer the defendant peace in exchange for a premium. 
In this Article, I examine several closure strategies employed in publicly 
available MDL settlements.10  Settlements, by their very nature, are flexible 
and do not follow preset rules.  Settlement designers seeking closure have, 
accordingly, tailored their strategies to the unique needs of different 
MDLs.11  And they frequently include multiple terms that work together in 
complex ways to encourage claimant participation.  In the taxonomy below, 
I attempt to group closure provisions into six categories reflecting different 
strategies for encouraging claimants to participate in global settlements 
instead of going it alone:  terms that (1) define the defendant’s exposure, (2) 
increase the value of participating in the settlement, (3) impair the litigation 
value of claims outside the settlement, (4) change the default rule to 
participation, (5) prevent lawyers from cherry-picking, and (6) alter the 
market for legal services.  
These categories overlap in many ways.  For example, terms that limit 
lawyer cherry-picking might also impair the litigation value of claims 
outside the settlement and alter the market for legal services.  Some terms 
also work together as complements.  A walk-away provision, for example, 
might create strategic dynamics that call for a lawyer-recommendation 
requirement, enforced by a lawyer-withdrawal provision, which, in turn, is 
made more effective by limits on lawyer advertising and referrals.  But 
grouping these various (and often complementary) settlement terms into 
different categories can be useful for thinking about how they work to 
achieve closure and some of the problems that they raise. 
I conclude with some thoughts on the role of the MDL judge when it 
comes to settlement.  I have argued elsewhere that MDL judges should 
actively evaluate and express an opinion on global settlements in MDLs, 
 
 10. For identifying MDL settlements worthy of examination, I am indebted to Elizabeth 
Burch’s and Margaret Williams’s impressive studies of recent MDL settlements and the 
repeat-player lawyers who crafted them. See Burch, supra note 7; Burch & Williams, supra 
note 7.  For a survey of terms that negotiating parties sometimes put in class action 
settlements to benefit themselves instead of class members, see Howard M. Erichson, 
Aggregation as Disempowerment:  Red Flags in Class Action Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 859 (2016). 
 11. Many of the MDL settlements I examine are nonclass aggregate settlements.  This is 
no surprise given the U.S. Supreme Court’s hostility toward resolving mass torts—which 
make up the bulk of MDL cases—through class action settlements. See, e.g., Robert H. 
Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013); Samuel Issacharoff, 
Professor, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Snapshot of MDL Caseload Statistics, Presentation at Mass-
Tort MDL Program at Duke University Law School 3 (Oct. 8, 2015), https://law.duke.edu/ 
sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/snapshot_mdl_caseload_statistics.pptx (“[P]roducts 
liability makes up 92% of all pending MDL actions.”) [https://perma.cc/8YEK-Y69R].  But 
several high profile MDLs have recently been resolved in class action settlements, and 
closure matters in class settlements too. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage 
Class Settlements:  The Godfather Guide to Opt-Out Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141.  It 
is important not to draw too rigid a line between class and nonclass settlements in the MDL 
context.  Claimants with positive-value claims who have filed their own lawsuits are likely 
to consciously decide to participate or not, whether the settlement is structured as a class 
action where they must opt out or a nonclass aggregate settlement where they must opt in. 
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even when structured as private, nonclass aggregate settlements.12  The 
complexity of these settlements and the risk that dealmakers may try to use 
closure provisions to foist an unattractive deal on claimants only heightens 
the need for scrutiny by an MDL judge.  It can be difficult for claimants to 
figure out on their own whether peace is worth the price.  But for judges to 
effectively evaluate—and signal to claimants—whether an MDL settlement 
is fair, they need to understand how closure provisions work and be able to 
tell the difference between terms designed to prevent strategic holdouts and 
those designed to stifle genuine dissent.  Thus, the following taxonomy 
attempts to break these provisions down and analyze how each of the 
various terms works to promote closure and affects claimant choice.  
I.  TERMS THAT DEFINE THE DEFENDANT’S EXPOSURE 
For claimants to offer the defendant peace through settlement, the 
negotiating parties need to be able to define the extent of the defendant’s 
exposure.  Walk-away provisions and case-census provisions fulfill this 
function. 
A.  Walk-Away Provisions 
When a defendant offers to settle claims on a global basis, it opens itself 
up to the risk of adverse selection.  Crafting a settlement that precisely 
values thousands of claims can be costly.  Parties, therefore, typically group 
claims into rough categories.  Claimants—and in particular claimants’ 
lawyers—tend to know more about the relative strength of their individual 
claims than the defendant.13  So if the defendant makes an open-ended offer 
to settle with all claimants who want to, the ones with the weakest claims 
within any given category will be the first on board.  As a result, the 
defendant risks overpaying the weakest claims, only to be left facing the 
strongest claims in continued litigation.14  If the defendant is going to put 
real money on the table, it needs assurance that it is buying something 
approaching total peace, not just a collection of the weakest claims.  Walk-
away provisions, which are ubiquitous in MDL settlements (class and 
nonclass alike), give the defendant just that. 
A walk-away provision allows the defendant to back out of the settlement 
if too few claimants sign on.  There are many variations.  The settlement 
can be a true all-or-nothing offer, which allows the defendant to back out if 
even a single claimant refuses to settle.15  More typically, the settlement 
will specify a lower participation threshold, say 95 percent of claimants, 
 
 12. Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge 
in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 1), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2828461 [https://perma.cc/JSJ9-GJ 
AE]. 
 13. See, e.g., Rave, supra note 1, at 1193–94. 
 14. See id. 
 15. E.g., Master Settlement Agreement §§ 6–7, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
06-md-1789 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Fosamax Settlement] (requiring 100 
percent participation). 
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below which the defendant can walk away.16  The walk-away threshold can 
also be tailored to ensure that a subset of claimants (e.g., those with a 
particular type of injury or even those represented by specific lawyers) is 
included.17  Indeed the threshold need not even be specified.  In the NFL 
concussion settlement, for example, the defendant retained an absolute right 
to terminate the settlement for a fixed period of time after learning how 
many claimants opted out.18 
The consequences of triggering the walk-away provision also vary.  It 
could be a nuclear option:  the defendant can blow up the whole deal if the 
threshold is not met.19  Or the walk-away provision could include a less 
drastic option, such as allowing the defendant to reduce the settlement 
amount proportionally if too few claimants participate.20 
Whatever its precise structure, a walk-away provision allows the 
defendant to change its mind about the settlement once it sees how the deal 
is shaping up.  If too few claimants (or the wrong kinds) are opting in, the 
defendant need not overpay for weak claims; it can back out of the deal.  
This protection from adverse selection allows the defendant to put more 
 
 16. See, e.g., 2015 ASR Settlement Agreement § 17.1.1, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. 
Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 10-md-2197 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2015) [hereinafter 
DePuy II Settlement] (setting a 94 percent walk-away threshold); Settlement Agreement 
§ 17.1.1, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 10-md-2197 
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2013) [hereinafter DePuy I Settlement] (94 percent); Settlement 
Agreement § 9.02, In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-2100 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 15 , 2013) [hereinafter Yaz Gallbladder 
Settlement] (90 percent); Settlement Agreement § 11.1, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
05-md-1657 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Vioxx Settlement] (85 percent). 
 17. See, e.g., ATE Master Settlement Agreement § 3.02, In re Yasmin and Yaz 
(Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 09-md-2100 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 
2015) [hereinafter Yaz ATE Settlement] (97.5 percent overall, 96 percent death and severe 
injury, 100 percent scheduled for trial); Master Settlement Agreement § 5.02, In re Actos 
(Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-md-2299 (W.D. La. Apr. 28, 2015) [hereinafter 
Actos Settlement] (95 percent overall, 95 percent death, 95 percent cystectomy, 95 percent 
under 60 years old, 95 percent used more than 12 months); Master Settlement Agreement 
§ 10.02, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab., No. 08-MD-1964 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 7, 2014) [hereinafter 
NuvaRing Settlement] (95 percent overall, 95 percent death, 95 percent ATE, 95 percent 
VTE, 95 percent recent injury, 95 percent timely filed); Vioxx Settlement, supra note 16, 
§ 11.1.5 (all of the PSC’s clients); Second MDL Program Term Sheet, § 1.B, In re Propulsid 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Propulsid II 
Settlement] (90 percent wrongful death, 95 percent other, 100 percent Achord); MDL-1355 
Term Sheet § 1.B, In re Propulsid Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 
2004) [hereinafter Propulsid I Settlement] (85 percent of wrongful death actions and 75 
percent of the remaining claims). 
 18. Class Action Settlement Agreement (as Amended) § 16.1, In re NFL Players’ 
Concussion Injury Litig., No. 12-md-2323 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2015) [hereinafter NFL 
Concussion Settlement]. 
 19. See, e.g., Vioxx Settlement, supra note 16, § 11.1.5. 
 20. See, e.g., Fosamax Settlement, supra note 15, § 11.B; Master Settlement Agreement 
§ IV.H, In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md-2325 
(S.D. W. Va. June 14, 2013) [hereinafter AMS Settlement]. 
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money on the table in the first place.21  In other words, the defendant may 
pay a peace premium, which benefits claimants as well as the defendant.22 
But a walk-away threshold also creates opportunities for individuals or 
groups of claimants to strategically hold out.  Even where a settlement 
requires less than 100 percent participation, a small, coordinated group of 
claimants (perhaps sharing the same lawyer) can hold the deal hostage by 
threatening to trigger the walk-away provision unless paid off.23 
Walk-away provisions guarantee the defendant at least a certain degree of 
closure, but they are not, by themselves, bad for individual claimants.24  
Walk-away provisions may actually give individual claimants more 
leverage if they can threaten to hold up the settlement.  But, these strategic 
dynamics create the need for some sort of cramdown mechanism to prevent 
holdouts from wrecking the deal.25  In other words, by guaranteeing the 
defendant a second look, the walk-away provision pressures the lawyers 
who negotiate the settlement (and will only get paid if it’s consummated) to 
find other tools—like the ones discussed below—to ensure that enough 
claimants participate. 
One creative variation aimed at addressing these strategic concerns is the 
sealed walk-away threshold.  In the BP oil spill settlement, for example, the 
PSC and defendant negotiated a walk-away threshold.  But instead of 
specifying the required percentage in the settlement agreement, they filed it 
under seal with the MDL judge.26  Keeping the precise threshold secret 
made it harder for any strategic player to coordinate a holdout bloc; he 
could not know for sure whether he had amassed enough willing opt-outs to 
credibly threaten the deal.27  By frustrating strategic holdouts, a sealed 
walk-away threshold may give the defendant some protection from adverse 
selection without as much need for other cramdown mechanisms. 
B.  Case-Census Provisions 
Case-census provisions also help define the defendant’s exposure.  In 
many MDL settlements, the defendant and PSC agree to jointly petition the 
MDL judge (often in cooperation with state judges managing parallel 
consolidations in state court) to order all lawyers with cases in the MDL to 
 
 21. Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the 
Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 418–19 (2014). 
 22. See Rave, supra note 1, at 1193–97. 
 23. Id. at 1200. 
 24. But cf. Erichson, supra note 7, at 1008–13 (endorsing lower thresholds, but arguing 
that walk-away provisions approaching 100 percent place coercive pressure on claimants). 
 25. See, e.g., Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate 
Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 767–68 (1997). 
 26. Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agreement as 
Amended on May 2, 2012, § 21.3.6, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in 
the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, No. 10-md-02179 (E.D. La. May 3, 2012) [hereinafter 
BP Settlement]. 
 27. Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 21, at 419. 
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register with the settlement administrator all claims in which they have a 
financial interest—whether filed or unfiled.28 
Case-census provisions help define the universe of claims over which the 
parties are negotiating.29  The information revealed can be used to set the 
denominator for a walk-away provision.30  But the more important part of a 
case-census provision is its ability to expose the existence of unfiled claims.  
It flushes wait-and-see claimants out into the open, so lawyers cannot keep 
a stable of unfiled claims out of the settlement and later spring them on a 
defendant that thinks it has purchased peace.  Requiring lawyers to register 
every claim in which they have a financial interest—not just the ones where 
they are counsel of record—also reveals information about referral 
networks on the plaintiffs’ side so the parties can identify the major 
aggregators. 
In conjunction with case-census provisions, MDL settlements often limit 
eligibility for payments to claimants who had retained a lawyer as of the 
settlement’s execution date.31  In effect, these terms use retaining a 
lawyer—instead of filing a lawsuit—as a proxy for how serious a threat the 
claimant poses.  Doing so captures the wait-and-see plaintiffs that the 
defendant wants in the settlement while avoiding the “Field of Dreams” 
problem:  if you build a mass settlement, claimants who never would have 
sued will come out of the woodwork to settle.32 
Although some have characterized case-census provisions as terms that 
benefit defendants by providing closure,33 they are not inherently coercive 
and do little to limit claimant choice.  They only require claimants who 
have remained anonymous to identify themselves.  That information 
facilitates the transaction.  Designing a comprehensive settlement is easier 
when the universe of claims—and thus the scope of the defendant’s 
exposure—is known than when the parties must account for potential 
claimants who may come out of the woodwork once the settlement is 
announced or stay in the woodwork and bring future claims outside the 
settlement. 
 
 28. See, e.g., Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 17, § 1.02; Actos Settlement, supra note 
17, § 1.02; DePuy II Settlement, supra note 16, § 3.2.1; NuvaRing Settlement, supra note 
17, § 1.5; DePuy I Settlement, supra note 16, § 3.2.1; Vioxx Settlement, supra note 16, 
§ 1.1. 
 29. Actos Settlement, supra note 17, § 1.01 (“The purposes of the registration 
requirements . . . are to allow the Parties and the Courts to identify the filed and unfiled cases 
and claims connected to ACTOS Products, to create a joint database of such cases and 
claims which will help the MDL Court and the Illinois and California Coordinated Courts 
cooperatively manage this litigation, and to assist the Parties with effectuating the provisions 
of this Agreement.”). 
 30. See Burch, supra note 7, at 90–91. 
 31. See, e.g., Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 17, § 2.02; NuvaRing Settlement, supra 
note 17, § 1.04; Yaz Gallbladder Settlement, supra note 16, § 1.05; see also Actos 
Settlement, supra note 17, § 2.04(A) (three-day grace period). 
 32. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 147 (2007). 
 33. Burch, supra note 7, at 90–91; Burch & Williams, supra note 7, at 48. 
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II.  TERMS THAT INCREASE THE VALUE 
OF PARTICIPATING IN THE SETTLEMENT 
A mass settlement will deliver more closure if it makes participating 
more attractive to claimants than continuing to litigate.  One way to do that 
is to increase the value of participation. 
A.  More Money 
The simplest way to get more claimants to settle is for the defendant to 
offer more money.  Claimants, unsurprisingly, like this particular closure 
strategy.  Defendants, by contrast, would rather keep the money and may 
worry about increasing incentives for strategic action. 
Defendants might be perfectly happy to pay real money to settle strong 
claims.  Defendants have reputations to maintain and may see value in 
putting a stop to the negative publicity, drag on stock prices, and unwanted 
regulatory scrutiny that often accompanies mass litigation.34  But they do 
not want to pay real money to strategic players who funnel weak claims into 
the settlement or threaten to hold up a deal.  Given their informational 
disadvantage relative to claimants and their lawyers, defendants may have a 
hard time differentiating between genuine and strategic players.  And the 
more money the defendant makes available in the settlement, the more the 
other side stands to gain from strategic action.  As a result, simply 
sweetening the pot may not always buy defendants the peace they desire.  
And, of course, defendants may prefer other, more coercive closure 
provisions when those bring peace at a lower cost. 
Recent examples of defendants seeking to purchase closure through 
generous payments include the BP oil spill and Volkswagen diesel 
emissions settlements.  To take just one aspect of the BP settlement, the 
seafood compensation program paid claimants several times as much as the 
voluntary compensation program that BP set up after the spill, totaling 
almost five times the annual revenue of the entire Gulf seafood industry.35  
In the Volkswagen settlements, the company agreed to buy back cars at 
their pre-emissions-scandal value on top of substantial restitution 
payments.36  Of course, an outsider cannot know how much the desire for 
closure factored into these settlements or gauge the effects of seemingly 
generous payments against the counterfactual where the defendant offered 
less.  While more money can buy more closure, it is difficult to measure 
when or how much. 
B.  Participation Bonuses 
Participation bonuses are a more tailored way to increase the value of 
participating in the settlement.  They work by increasing the total settlement 
 
 34. See Rave, supra note 1, at 1195. 
 35. See Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 21, at 405–06, 410–11. 
 36. Consumer Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release (Amended), § 4, In re 
Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 15-md-2672 
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2016) [hereinafter Volkswagen Settlement]. 
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fund in escalating amounts as participation approaches 100 percent.  In the 
Propulsid settlement, for example, the defendant agreed to pay a base 
amount of $69.5 million as long as 85 percent of wrongful-death claimants 
opted in, but the defendant would add on escalating payments for each 
additional percentage point of participation:  $700,000 for each point 
between 86 percent and 90 percent, $900,000 for each point between 91 
percent and 95 percent, and $1.7 million for each point between 96 percent 
and 100 percent.37  The World Trade Center disaster site settlement had a 
similar structure:  the defendants would pay $625 million if 95 percent of 
claimants opted in, escalating up to $712.5 million if 100 percent opted in.38  
In other words, to get the last 5 percent to sign on, the defendant was 
willing to pay more than twice as much per claimant as for the first 95 
percent.39 
Participation bonuses like these reflect the defendant’s willingness to pay 
a premium for peace, and they benefit claimants who can deliver it.40  
Although the defendant is paying more money for the last claim than for 
earlier claims, the extra money does not go to the last claimant.  Instead, it 
goes into the total fund to be allocated according to whatever formula is in 
the settlement agreement.  This works out well for claimants, as they can 
capture the peace premium if enough of them opt in, but they still get paid 
something if they cannot deliver total peace; the deal does not evaporate 
because a handful reject it.  In this sense, participation bonuses are the 
flipside of terms that allow the defendant to reduce the settlement amount if 
the walk-away threshold is not met instead of blowing up the whole deal.41  
Participation bonuses, however, give claimants more advance certainty 
because they do not give the defendant the option to go nuclear instead of 
simply withholding a premium. 
Because the whole deal’s viability is not at stake, participation bonuses 
present less incentive and opportunity for strategic players to hold out.  But 
because money will be left on the table if some claimants refuse to 
participate, lawyers may still be tempted to pressure clients to opt in. 
 
 37. Propulsid I Settlement, supra note 17, § 3.B.  The second Propulsid settlement had a 
similar structure.  Neither settlement’s participation-bonus feature actually resulted in 
additional compensation for claimants because too few qualified for payments, and the 
unexhausted fund reverted to the defendant. See Burch, supra note 7, at 89–90.  But the 
Propulsid structure still illustrates how participation bonuses can function. 
 38. World Trade Center Litigation Settlement Process Agreement, as Amended, §§ II.A, 
IV, VI.E (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db=911&id=540 
[https://perma.cc/7AUV-CZ39].  The World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation was not 
technically an MDL, but it was a similarly structured mass consolidation of all cases arising 
out of the 9/11 terrorists attacks. 
 39. Rave, supra note 1, at 1184–85. 
 40. The Actos settlement also included participation bonuses, but they were not 
escalating like Propulsid or WTC, so they less clearly reflect a peace premium. Actos 
Settlement, supra note 17, § 10.01(A). 
 41. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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III.  TERMS THAT IMPAIR THE LITIGATION VALUE OF CLAIMS 
OUTSIDE THE SETTLEMENT 
Boosting the benefits of participation is not the only way to make 
settlement look more attractive than litigation.  The dealmakers may also 
include terms that make continued litigation harder.  These terms do more 
than take away benefits of aggregation (e.g., scale economies, shared 
resources, and risk pooling) and actually impair the litigation value of 
claims outside of the settlement. 
A.  Lone Pine Orders 
Lone Pine orders are not actually settlement terms, though the settling 
parties may agree to jointly petition the MDL judge for one after the 
settlement is consummated.  Lone Pine orders are case-management orders 
that require nonsettling plaintiffs in the MDL to come forward with certain 
evidence (typically medical or expert evidence of injury or causation) by a 
certain deadline or face summary judgment.42  In other words, nonsettling 
plaintiffs have to “put up or shut up.” 
Although they are sometimes described as a “post-settlement mop-up 
procedure,”43 Lone Pine orders do not require anything of claimants that 
they would not ultimately have to produce at trial.  So they do not, in that 
sense, significantly impair the litigation value of nonsettling claims.  They 
do, however, accelerate the time frame and force claimants’ lawyers to 
invest in these cases right away or abandon them.  In that sense, 
participating in a global settlement may look relatively more attractive. 
B.  Most-Favored-Nation Clauses 
Most-favored-nation clauses are agreements that, if the defendant 
subsequently settles on more favorable terms with any claimant outside the 
global settlement, it will retroactively increase payments to participating 
claimants to match.  While it might look like these terms increase the value 
of participating and thus belong in the previous category, that is not their 
primary function.  A most-favored-nation clause is designed to never be 
triggered.  Instead it signals to claimants that they will not get a better deal 
outside of the global settlement, because it would cost the defendant too 
much to top up all of the participating claimants.44  The defendant is 
essentially precommitting to fight nonparticipating claimants tooth and nail. 
 
 42. Lone Pine Order, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see, e.g., Lore v. Lone 
Pine Corp., No. L-33606-85, 1986 WL 637507 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986); 
Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 
123, 155 (2012). 
 43. Burch, supra note 7, at 100 (quoting PSC’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Opposition to Defendant Merck’s Motion for Entry of Lone Pine Order at 7, In re 
Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 06-md-1789 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2012)). 
 44. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class 
Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 218 (2003). 
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Most-favored-nation clauses have been used in several class action 
settlements within MDLs.45  But they may be less practical in nonclass 
aggregate settlements (particularly mass torts), where the details and 
strength of claims may vary significantly.  Because a most-favored-nation 
clause is triggered when the defendant settles on more favorable terms with 
a nonparticipating claimant, there must be some way to determine whether 
the terms were or were not more favorable.  And that can be difficult if the 
claimants are differently situated (i.e., the nonparticipating claimant might 
get more money for more severe injuries).  Further, this is something that 
the parties would be likely to fight about postsettlement, undermining the 
point of a closure provision to begin with.  So some mass tort settlements, 
like those offering relatively uniform compensation on a defined grid, may 
be amenable to most-favored-nation clauses, while others, like those that 
enlist a settlement administrator to determine individualized payments, may 
not. 
When they are used, most-favored-nation clauses provide a powerful 
incentive for claimants to participate in the global settlement, unless they 
are willing to take their cases to trial. 
C.  Trust Secured by All of the Defendant’s Assets 
An even stronger way to impair the litigation value of claims outside the 
settlement is to use the settlement to effectively make them junior creditors 
to participating claimants.  The parties in the Sulzer hip case attempted to 
employ this strategy by creating a trust to pay claims in a comprehensive 
settlement program.46  The trust was funded with the defendant’s insurance 
proceeds, cash, and much of its future income stream, and it was secured by 
a lien on all of Sulzer’s assets—although those assets could be sold free and 
clear of the lien for business purposes, so long as the proceeds did not go to 
pay nonparticipating claimants.47  This trust-and-lien structure severely 
impaired the litigation value of claims outside the settlement.  Even if a 
nonparticipating claimant won his trial and appeal, he could not collect on 
any of Sulzer’s assets until all participating claimants had been paid through 
the settlement program—a process expected to take six years, with no 
guarantee that anything would be left over.48 
The Sulzer hip settlement was done as a class action, but there is no 
reason that MDL dealmakers could not adopt a similar trust-and-lien 
structure for a nonclass aggregate settlement that would take effect once 
some threshold number of claimants opted in.  If they did, there would be 
no judicial fairness review under Rule 23(e) to derail the deal, as the courts 
 
 45. See, e.g., In re Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 215 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000); 
Brown v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., No. Civ. 98-1282DRD, 2005 WL 1917869, at *10 
(D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2005); see also 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 
§ 13:5 (5th ed. 2014). 
 46. Nagareda, supra note 44, at 209–11. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 209–10 (quoting Sulzer’s lawyer, Richard Scruggs). 
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effectively did in the Sulzer case.49  Though perhaps there are limits to how 
far the defendant and PSC can go in using this sort of trust-and-lien 
structure in a nonclass settlement to foist an unattractive deal on claimants.  
A nonclass aggregate settlement would require initial buy-in from enough 
claimants (many of whom will have separate representation in the MDL) to 
make it look like the deal will succeed before it would pose a credible threat 
to claimants who would rather not participate.  In a class action, by contrast, 
all of the claimants are presumptively in the settlement, unless they have the 
guts to opt out in the hopes that enough other claimants will follow them to 
destroy the deal.  But even in a nonclass aggregate settlement, the trust-and-
lien structure could be a powerful tool to cramdown a settlement with buy-
in from the majority over the objection of a minority of claimants who 
believe they are being underpaid. 
IV.  TERMS THAT CHANGE 
THE DEFAULT RULE TO PARTICIPATION 
Another way to increase closure in an MDL settlement is to shift the 
default rule from nonparticipation to participation.  This is most easily and 
legitimately achieved through a class action settlement, but parties in MDLs 
have experimented with shifting the default rule contractually as well. 
A.  Class Action Settlement 
The ultimate closure mechanism would be to structure the settlement as a 
mandatory class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) or 
(b)(2).  But in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.50 and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes,51 the U.S. Supreme Court has limited mandatory class actions to a 
narrow set of circumstances. 
Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class actions are also limited to situations where 
the claims are similar enough to form a cohesive class and thus unavailable 
in many MDLs.52  But class action settlements in MDLs are by no means 
rare.  To name just a few high-profile examples, the MDLs in the BP oil 
spill, NFL concussion, and Volkswagen diesel emissions litigations were all 
resolved through class-action settlements.53 
A class action settlement increases closure by shifting from an opt-in 
model to an opt-out model.  Instead of individual claimants needing to 
affirmatively sign on to the settlement, all claimants within the class 
 
 49. The parties renegotiated the settlement to eliminate the trust-and-lien structure and 
pay claimants more after the Sixth Circuit expressed “serious doubts” about the district 
court’s approval of the settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). See In re 
Inter-op Hip Prosthesis Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 01-4039, 2001 WL 1774017 (6th Cir. Oct. 
29, 2001), vacated in part, No. 01-4039, 2001 WL 34110370 (6th Cir. 2001); Nagareda, 
supra note 44, at 215–16. 
 50. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 51. 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 52. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). 
 53. Volkswagen Settlement, supra note 36; NFL Concussion Settlement, supra note 18; 
BP Settlement, supra note 26. 
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definition are automatically bound by the settlement unless they opt out.  
Default rules are “sticky,” the theory goes, so changing the default from 
nonparticipation to participation will inevitably sweep in more claimants.54 
The default rule matters tremendously in small-claims class actions, 
where most class member pay little attention to their claims.  But it matters 
less to claimants who have gone through the trouble of hiring a lawyer and 
filing a lawsuit that was consolidated in the MDL.  Particularly in mass tort 
MDLs, where claims are often substantial, plaintiffs with cases pending are 
going to make a conscious decision to participate or not in the settlement, 
no matter what the default rule is. 
Where a class action settlement can offer additional closure is in its 
ability to reach potential claimants who have not yet filed suit.  If these 
claimants can be properly included in the class definition, the class action 
settlement can force them to decide by a certain date to either opt out of the 
settlement or forever forego their right to sue.55  Of course, a class action 
settlement requires court approval, and the cases where dealmakers find it 
most advantageous to secure closure—to bind exposure-only claimants—
are the very scenarios where courts are most skeptical about its use.56 
B.  Automatic-Enrollment Provisions 
Some enterprising dealmakers have attempted to recreate features of the 
class action’s opt-out default rule in nonclass MDL settlements.  In the Yaz 
gallbladder settlement, for example, the negotiating parties agreed that the 
MDL judge would enter case-management orders in all gallbladder-injury 
cases pending in the federal MDL that would automatically enroll plaintiffs 
in the settlement unless they affirmatively opted out by a certain date.57  If 
these plaintiffs did not opt out and did not submit claim packages in the 
settlement program, their cases would be dismissed with prejudice.58  The 
MDL judge entered the requested orders.59 
The scope of the Yaz settlement’s shift to an opt-out model was, 
however, significantly more limited than a Rule 23(b)(3) class action 
settlement.  The automatic-enrollment provision did not apply to claimants 
with cases pending in state court, those with unfiled claims, or even all 
claims pending in the federal MDL.60  It expressly excluded claimants 
 
 54. See Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 21, at 425. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN & 
RICHARD H. THALER, NUDGE:  IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND 
HAPPINESS (2008); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives:  Behavioral 
Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003). 
 55. See Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 21, at 421–22. 
 56. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. 
at 623; Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001).  But see In re NFL 
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
 57. Yaz Gallbladder Settlement, supra note 16, §§ 1.01(A), 6.01(A). 
 58. Id. § 6.01(A). 
 59. Order No. 60:  Case Management (Settlement Agreement and Deadlines—
Gallbladder Injuries) at 2–4, In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practice. & 
Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-2100 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Yaz Case 
Management Order]. 
 60. Id. at 4. 
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alleging more serious injuries alongside their gallbladder claims.61  All of 
those claimants were eligible to participate in the settlement, but they would 
have to affirmatively opt in. 
This sort of automatic-enrollment provision required the cooperation of 
the MDL judge, and it is not clear that judges have this power.  The court 
went along with the plan in Yaz, where the claims for gallbladder injury 
were modest and fairly uniform.62  And there is a plausible argument that 
shifting the default rule on such claims might be justified as an attempt to 
reduce transaction costs for modest claims pending in the federal MDL.  
The automatic-enrollment program excluded higher-value claims and 
provided a robust form of notice—entry on the individual dockets for 
represented parties with currently pending federal cases.63  But it is 
unquestionably an aggressive use of the MDL judge’s case-management 
power to change the default rule without Rule 23’s formal protections. 
Claimants’ lawyers might also try to shift the default rule without any 
judicial participation.  In the Propulsid settlement, for example, the 
(presumably negotiated) form letter that the PSC designed for participating 
lawyers to send their clients said that the lawyers would be opting all of 
their clients into the settlement unless they returned an enclosed opt-out 
form.64  The Propulsid settlement included more substantial and less 
uniform claims than the Yaz gallbladder settlement, but the letter 
acknowledged that most claimants would receive no compensation under 
the settlement.65  Such unilateral action by the lawyers would seem to run 
afoul of the legal ethical rules governing settlement.66 
V.  TERMS THAT PREVENT LAWYERS FROM CHERRY-PICKING 
Because a class action gives a single lawyer monopoly control over the 
class members’ claims, the defendant need only negotiate with one 
counterparty to craft a comprehensive settlement.67  Without that 
monopoly, MDL defendants must deal with hordes of claimants either 
individually or through their bargaining agents.  Defendants can—and do—
deal with the court-appointed PSC as a counterparty in settlement 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Yaz Gall Bladder Settlement, supra note 16, § 2.05. 
 63. Yaz Case Management Order, supra note 59. 
 64. Form Letter Claims on Behalf of Decedents at 3, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., 
No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Propulsid Form Letter], http:// 
www.laed.uscourts.gov/case-information/mdl-mass-class-action/propulsid (“WE WILL BE 
OPTING YOUR CLAIM INTO THE SETTLEMENT PROGRAM UNLESS YOU 
RETURN TO US, VIA CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT, AN OPT OUT FORM.  
THE OPT OUT FORM IS ENCLOSED. IT SHOULD ONLY BE RETURNED TO US IN 
THE EVENT YOU DO NOT DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SETTLEMENT 
PROGRAM. YOU MUST RETURN THE OPT OUT FORM BY AUGUST 15, 2004 OR 
ELSE YOUR CLAIM WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE SETTLEMENT PROGRAM.”) 
[https://perma.cc/NVP4-ZHVY]. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer 
shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.”); id. r. 1.4 (communications). 
 67. See Nagareda, supra note 44, at 164. 
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negotiations.68  But the PSC does not control all of the claims like a class 
action lawyer.  While the PSC can negotiate the structure of a global 
settlement, they still need buy-in from the claimants and their individual 
lawyers. 
The network of client solicitation and referral arrangements that exists on 
the plaintiffs’ side in mass litigation tends to consolidate groups of 
claimants in the hands of major aggregators.69  Given the inevitability of 
this sort of informal aggregation, MDL dealmakers in the early 2000s hit on 
an innovation where defendants do deals with the lawyers instead of with 
the claimants directly.70  These deals make each lawyer’s inventory the unit 
of negotiation and typically take the form of a global offer to all of the 
lawyers in the MDL to settle their case inventories. 
But dealing with lawyers, inventory by inventory instead of claim by 
claim, creates opportunities for cherry-picking.  Knowing more than the 
defendant about the strength of claims in their inventories, the lawyers will 
predictably funnel the weakest claims into the settlement and use the threat 
of taking the strongest claims to trial to hold out for more—exactly the type 
of adverse selection that the defendant wants (and may be willing to pay) to 
avoid.  This is, after all, why defendants insist on terms like walk-away 
provisions.  So the defendant and PSC try to design these deals so that a 
lawyer who wants to settle any claims in the global settlement must agree to 
settle all of the claims in his or her inventory.71  There are several strategies 
by which dealmakers try to limit lawyer cherry-picking. 
A.  Voting 
One way for a lawyer to precommit not to engage in cherry-picking is to 
have his clients agree in advance to be bound by a vote among themselves 
on whether to accept a group settlement offer.72  Claimants might find this 
arrangement advantageous because it allows their lawyer to offer to settle 
their claims as a single package in exchange for a peace premium.73 
Binding claimants to a vote disables would-be holdouts, thereby 
maximizing the group’s collective negotiating position.  And, although 
individual claimants can be bound over their objection, the voting 
mechanism does not shift leverage toward the defendant the way that terms 
 
 68. In this sense, the PSC shares some of the state-conferred monopolistic features of 
class counsel. See Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3165, 3168 (2013). 
 69. See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation:  Procedural and Ethical 
Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 387 
(2000); Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury 
Litigation:  A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 963 (1993); Judith Resnik, 
From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 28–35 (1991).  Informal 
aggregation has been going on for a long time. See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, 
The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement:  An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1596 (2004). 
 70. See Burch, supra note 7, at 90–91. 
 71. See id. at 127. 
 72. See, e.g., Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 515 (N.J. 2006). 
 73. See, e.g., Rave, supra note 1, at 1187; Silver & Baker, supra note 25, at 751. 
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impairing the litigation value of claims outside the settlement do.74  
Because claimants can still participate in the settlement if they are outvoted, 
those opposed to the deal can safely vote against it; they need not take the 
much bigger risk of opting out and litigating alone.75  This makes it difficult 
for the defendant to lowball the group.  But, like any majoritarian process, it 
creates the risk that claimants in the minority (especially those with 
atypically strong claims) can be exploited, so a fair allocation process is 
critical to making voting work.76 
Although the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation 
endorsed a voting mechanism along these lines, no state has yet modified its 
ethics rules to permit it.77  The voting arrangement is inconsistent with 
prevailing interpretations of the aggregate settlement rule, and there are 
concerns about how genuine clients’ advance consent can be.78  The debate 
is well ventilated.79  I will not rehash it here, except to say that voting can 
prevent lawyer cherry-picking without many of the undesirable features of 
other closure provisions that dealmakers use in MDL settlements. 
B.  Lawyer-Recommendation Provisions 
Another way that dealmakers try to limit cherry-picking is by requiring 
lawyers who enroll claimants to agree to recommend the settlement to all 
clients in their inventories (typically both those who have filed lawsuits and 
those who have signed retainer agreements but not yet filed).  In other 
words, the lawyer cannot funnel only weak claims into the settlement, 
because, in order for any client to participate, the lawyer must become a 
party to the settlement and agree to recommend it to all clients. 
Lawyer-recommendation provisions take many forms.  The Propulsid 
settlement, the original Vioxx settlement, and the AMS mesh products 
 
 74. Rave, supra note 1, at 1248–49. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1249–50. 
 77. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.17 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); 
see Carol A. Needham, Advance Consent to Aggregate Settlements:  Reflections on 
Attorneys’ Fiduciary Obligations and Professional Responsibility Duties, 44 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 511, 515 (2012) (noting that no state has adopted the ALI voting mechanism). 
 78. See Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 521, 523 (N.J. 2006); 
Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 7, at 298–311; Nancy J. Moore, The Case Against 
Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule in Mass Tort Lawsuits, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 149, 
180–81 (1999). 
 79. Compare Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action:  Lawyer Loyalty and 
Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 570–
71, Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 7, Nancy J. Moore, The Absence of Legal Ethics in the 
ALI’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation:  A Missed Opportunity—And More, 79 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 717, 718 (2011), Nancy J. Moore, The American Law Institute’s Draft 
Proposal to Bypass the Aggregate Settlement Rule:  Do Mass Tort Clients Need (or Want) 
Group Decisionmaking?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 401 (2008), Moore, supra note 78, and 
Thomas D. Morgan, Client Representation vs. Case Administration:  The ALI Looks at Legal 
Ethics Issues in Aggregate Settlements, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 734, 734 (2011), with Rave, 
supra note 1, Charles Silver, Ethics and Innovation, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754, 757 
(2011), Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose:  The Role of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in 
Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1469 (1998), and Silver & Baker, 
supra note 25. 
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settlement included strong forms of lawyer-recommendation provisions, 
which simply required any participating lawyer to recommend the 
settlements to all of his or her clients.80  The lawyer must be either all in as 
to his or her inventory or all out.  This strong provision can put a lawyer 
who believes the settlement is a good deal for some clients, but a bad deal 
for others, in an ethical pickle.81  The lawyer cannot loyally serve both sets 
of clients simultaneously by being all in or all out. 
Accordingly, many lawyer-recommendation provisions include an ethical 
out—conditioning the recommendation on the lawyer’s independent 
professional judgment.  The details matter for these ethical outs.  Some, like 
the amended Vioxx settlement, appear to be little more than window 
dressing.  Participating lawyers had to agree that they had exercised their 
“independent judgment in the best interests of each client individually” and, 
having done so, that they would recommend participation to 100 percent of 
their clients.82  This does not present a problem where the lawyer truly 
believes that the settlement is in the best interest of each and every client.  
But if the lawyer believes that some, but not all, clients would do better 
litigating alone, the lawyer is placed in an untenable situation.83  He can 
either not participate and violate the duty to bring all settlement offers to 
clients or participate and give bad advice to some clients. 
Other MDL settlements appear to offer lawyers a real ethical out.  The 
DePuy ASR settlement, for example, stressed that the ultimate decision 
whether to enroll “rests with each individual” claimant.84  Participating 
lawyers had to agree that “subject to the exercise of their independent 
professional judgment as to the circumstances of individual clients, they 
will endorse enrollment in [the settlement] to clients covered by this 
Agreement” and that they would use their “best efforts” to obtain all of the 
required documentation “from all of their clients who elect to enroll.”85  
And the Yaz ATE settlement required lawyers to agree that “counsel for 
each Claimant shall individually evaluate their client’s participation in this 
Program, and shall recommend participation in the Program to all clients 
for whom they believe participation is appropriate.”86 
Although scholars sometimes lump all of these lawyer-recommendation 
provisions together as terms that reduce client choice,87 they differ 
significantly.  A lawyer participating in the DePuy settlement would not 
 
 80. AMS Settlement, supra note 20, § IV.B; Vioxx Settlement, supra note 16, § 1.2.8.1; 
Propulsid II Settlement, supra note 17, § 3.D; Propulsid I Settlement, supra note 17, § 3.D. 
 81. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 7, at 283–84. 
 82. Amendment to Settlement Agreement § 1.2.2, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
05-md-1657 (E.D. La. Jan. 17, 2008). 
 83. See Conn. Bar Ass’n, Informal Op. 08-01 (2008) (explaining the obligations of 
plaintiffs’ counsel under a particular aggregate settlement agreement); Erichson, supra note 
7, at 1004.  But see Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the Pursuit of Ethical Finality, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1943, 1952–57 (2017) (arguing that a lawyer could not participate as to 
any clients). 
 84. DePuy I Settlement, supra note 16, § 17.2.5. 
 85. Id. § 17.2.8. 
 86. Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 17, § 1.02(D). 
 87. Burch, supra note 7, at 90–91; Burch & Williams, supra note 7, at 59–60. 
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face the same ethical conundrum as in the Vioxx settlement if he thought 
the settlement was a good deal for some but not all of his clients.  And the 
Yaz ATE settlement seems to require lawyers to do exactly what ethical 
lawyers should do. 
Finally, some MDL settlements include terms requiring lawyers on the 
PSC to use their “best efforts” to achieve sufficient participation.88  
Although these best-efforts provisions are sometimes lumped in with other 
lawyer-recommendation provisions,89 they do not operate the same way, 
and they do little to prevent lawyer cherry-picking because they apply only 
to the PSC, not to the lawyers who are signing up inventories in the 
settlement the PSC negotiated.  Those lawyers remain free to recommend 
the settlement to some clients but not others. 
While some lawyer-recommendation provisions may be unobjectionable, 
the stronger forms can encourage lawyers to treat their clients as groups, not 
as individuals.90  And if the settlement is a good deal for the group as a 
whole, the lawyer may be tempted to give bad advice to individual clients 
who might do better outside of the settlement if it means that the group can 
participate (and the lawyer can get paid). 
But even the strongest forms of lawyer-recommendation provisions are 
rather weak closure devices standing alone.  It is unclear how they could be 
enforced without intrusive discovery into the lawyer-client relationship.  
Ethical outs give lawyers plenty of wiggle room to steer clients with strong 
claims out of the settlement.  And dissatisfied clients can ignore the 
lawyer’s (perhaps half-hearted) recommendation, while the lawyer says, 
“Well, I tried.”  For these reasons, lawyer-recommendation provisions are 
often combined with other terms, such as inventory-expulsion or lawyer-
withdrawal provisions, to give them teeth. 
C.  Inventory-Expulsion Provisions 
Inventory-expulsion provisions put some teeth in lawyer-
recommendation provisions and help to enforce the in-for-a-penny-in-for-a-
pound nature of the deal between the defendant and the lawyers.  Like other 
closure provisions, their forms can vary. 
Some impose a flat ban:  participating lawyers “shall not be permitted to 
enroll less than 100% of the MDL plaintiffs they represent.”91  These 
inventory-expulsion provisions work by tying lawyers’ financial incentives 
to their ability to deliver their entire inventories.  If even one client does not 
want to participate, the lawyer risks having his entire inventory shut out of 
the deal, meaning that he cannot get paid for enrolling any claimants in the 
settlement.  This creates a temptation for the lawyer to pressure the 
 
 88. Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 17, § 3.01; Actos Settlement, supra note 17, § 5.01; 
NuvaRing Settlement, supra note 17, § 10.01; Yaz Gallbladder Settlement, supra note 16, 
§ 9.01. 
 89. Burch, supra note 7, at 91; Burch & Williams, supra note 7, at 59–60. 
 90. See, e.g., Burch, supra note 7, at 104. 
 91. Propulsid II Settlement, supra note 17, § 3.D; Propulsid I Settlement, supra note 17, 
§ 3.D. 
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reluctant client into participating so that the lawyer (and other clients) can 
get paid. 
Other inventory-expulsion provisions are more nuanced.  The Vioxx 
settlement gave the defendant an option to expel all or part of a lawyer’s 
inventory if the lawyer failed to recommend participation to all of his 
clients or attempt to withdraw from representing nonsettling claimants.92  
Thus the lawyer’s fate was not tied to a single recalcitrant client, as long as 
the lawyer took all necessary steps to try to withdraw from representing that 
client. 
Further, the DePuy settlement allowed the defendant to expel a 
participating lawyer’s inventory if, and only if, the special master appointed 
to oversee the settlement found that that lawyer “did not act in good faith” 
in connection with the lawyer-recommendation provision, which included a 
real ethical out.93  So the defendant could not kick a lawyer’s inventory out 
of the deal unilaterally but only upon a neutral party’s finding that the 
lawyer acted in bad faith.94 
How coercive this is depends on what counts as “good faith,” and the key 
provision in the DePuy settlement is that the special master, not the 
defendant, will make that determination.95  Would a lawyer be acting in 
good faith if he told a client with a good shot of winning at trial to reject the 
settlement because he would get more by litigating alone?  Or by advising a 
client who had nonmonetary reasons for litigating not to settle?  The DePuy 
settlement’s lawyer-recommendation provision included an ethical out, so 
quite probably yes, that would be a good faith reason to recommend that 
some clients not participate.  But a lawyer would probably not act in good 
faith by telling clients with weaker claims to take the settlement and then 
using the remaining stronger claims to threaten to trigger the walk-away 
threshold unless he got a side payment.  Such strategic behavior could 
hardly be described as good faith.  What about a lawyer who thought that 
the settlement offer probably exceeded the expected value of his client’s 
claim but thought he could negotiate a larger payment outside of the global 
settlement because of the defendant’s desire to end negative publicity?  Is 
that good faith?  Perhaps a zealous advocate should make such a move on 
his client’s behalf.  But the extra payment that the claimant may be able to 
extract is not tied to the individual merit of the claim.  Reasonable minds 
could differ. 
The good faith inventory-expulsion provision in DePuy creates 
uncertainty for the lawyer.  Advising clients not to opt in to the settlement 
puts the lawyer’s entire inventory at risk depending on the special master’s 
 
 92. Vioxx Settlement, supra note 16, § 1.2.6.2. 
 93. DePuy I Settlement, supra note 16, § 17.2.12; see also id. §§ 17.2.8, 17.2.9–.11. 
 94. Contrary to some suggestions, the DePuy good faith provision does not operate like 
a lawyer-withdrawal provision. Cf. Burch, supra note 7, at 103–04.  An inventory-expulsion 
provision pressures lawyers into enrolling their entire inventories and works only indirectly 
on claimants, if the lawyers in turn pressure their clients to settle.  A lawyer-withdrawal 
provision puts direct pressure on claimants, telling them that if they do not participate, they 
will have to find another lawyer. 
 95. See supra note 93. 
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view of good faith.  Therefore, a lawyer might think twice about advising a 
client not to settle.  Depending on the special master’s interpretation, 
however, a good faith provision may actually be well tailored to limit 
strategic holdouts and still allow claimants who have atypically strong 
claims or genuine problems with the deal to continue to litigate with the 
same lawyer. 
D.  Lawyer-Withdrawal Provisions 
Another way to put teeth into a lawyer-recommendation provision is to 
pair it with a lawyer-withdrawal provision.  These terms require 
participating lawyers to withdraw from representing any client who does 
not opt in to the settlement. 
Lawyer-withdrawal provisions reduce the temptation for lawyers to 
cherry-pick by half-heartedly recommending the settlement to clients with 
strong claims because the lawyer cannot continue to represent those clients 
in litigation.  These provisions are lower stakes than inventory-expulsion 
provisions for participating lawyers because the lawyer can still participate 
in the deal even if some clients do not want to.  Therefore, the pressure on 
the lawyer to sign up every client is correspondingly lessened.  But lawyer-
withdrawal provisions decouple the lawyer’s financial interests from client 
choice.  The only way the lawyer can collect a full contingency fee is for 
the client to opt in to the settlement.  The lawyer’s advice may thus be 
skewed toward participation. 
Like lawyer-recommendation provisions, the details of lawyer-
withdrawal provisions matter.  Some settlements include strong and 
sophisticated lawyer-withdrawal provisions.  The Vioxx settlement, for 
example, required participating lawyers to not only withdraw from 
representing nonsettling clients but also to forgo any financial interest in 
any Vioxx-related claim, filed or unfiled.96  This meant that lawyers could 
not get paid for work already done for nonsettling clients, and they could 
not take a referral fee for sending those clients to other lawyers.  In other 
words, the only way the lawyers could be paid anything for their clients’ 
claims is if they participated in the settlement. 
Other settlements include less sophisticated, weaker lawyer-withdrawal 
provisions.  The AMS mesh products settlement, for example, required 
participating lawyers to withdraw from representing nonsettling clients but 
did not require them to forgo any financial interest in those clients’ 
claims.97  Presumably, the lawyers could take a referral fee for sending 
nonsettling clients to other lawyers or seek payment for work already done 
on their cases.  And the settlement included an ethical out:  the lawyers 
were only required to withdraw “[t]o the extent permitted by the rules of 
professional conduct in any jurisdiction in which the firm may practice.”98 
 
 96. Vioxx Settlement, supra note 16, § 1.2.8.2. 
 97. AMS Settlement, supra note 20, § IV.I. 
 98. Id.  Professor Baker has argued that the Vioxx settlement included a similar ethical 
out. Baker, supra note 83, at 1962–65. 
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Finally, the lawyer-withdrawal provision may sometimes be implicit.  
The Propusid settlement contained no express lawyer-withdrawal provision, 
but participating lawyers interpreted the settlement to allow them to 
withdraw from representing nonsettling claimants in order to prevent the 
defendant from excluding them under the inventory-expulsion provision.99  
Similarly, the Fosamax settlement had no explicit lawyer-withdrawal 
provision, but its walk-away provision gave the defendant the option to 
terminate the entire deal or proportionally reduce the settlement amount if 
less than 100 percent of claimants opted in.100  Several participating 
lawyers who could not persuade their entire inventories to sign on withdrew 
from representing the nonsettling clients, and the defendant reduced the 
settlement amount accordingly.101 
While lawyer-withdrawal provisions put less pressure on lawyers to sign 
up every client than inventory-expulsion provisions, they put far more 
pressure on the individual claimants.  In order to reject the global 
settlement, a claimant needs to find a new lawyer.  I leave for others the 
question of whether lawyer-withdrawal provisions are consistent with the 
legal ethics rules.102  But permitted or not, having to find a new lawyer is a 
big imposition on claimants and—like terms that impair the litigation value 
of claims outside the global settlement—raises the cost of not participating 
in the deal.103 
Exactly how much a lawyer-withdrawal provision raises the cost of not 
settling depends on the availability of new counsel willing to represent 
nonsettling claimants.  In a competitive legal market where new lawyers are 
readily available and withdrawing counsel can refer nonsettling clients to 
other competent lawyers, the impact on claimant choice is limited.  
Claimants might lose their first-choice lawyers, but they retain a realistic 
choice between opting into the settlement or continuing to litigate with 
another lawyer.  If, however, the settlement disrupts the referral market for 
existing lawyers familiar with this type of litigation and barriers to entry for 
new lawyers are high, then lawyer-withdrawal provisions can make it 
difficult for dissatisfied claimants to reject the settlement.  This may allow 
the defendant and PSC to foist a less attractive deal on claimants. 
VI.  TERMS THAT ALTER THE MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES 
In MDLs, and mass litigation more generally, lawyers—not individual 
claimants—are the important players.  Indeed, this is the premise of 
structuring settlements as deals between the defendant and the claimants’ 
 
 99. Propulsid Form Letter, supra note 64, at 2. 
 100. See supra note 15. 
 101. Burch, supra note 7, at 99. 
 102. Professors Erichson and Zipursky have argued that the lawyer-withdrawal provisions 
of the Vioxx settlement violated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) (on client 
control over settlement), 5.6(b) (on restrictions on the practice of law), and 1.16 (on 
termination of the lawyer-client relationship). Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 7, at 284–90.  
Professor Baker offers a contrary interpretation. Baker, supra note 83, at 1962–65. 
 103. See Rave, supra note 1, at 1210. 
2017] CLOSURE PROVISIONS IN MDL SETTLEMENTS 2197 
lawyers, not the claimants themselves.104  Without lawyers willing and able 
to press (and finance) their claims outside of the settlement, claimants have 
little ability to threaten the defendant enough to achieve a superior result.  
Thus, as Professor Richard Nagareda explains, claimants’ ability to exit an 
undesirable settlement depends on alternative lawyers’ ability to enter the 
market and seek such claimants as clients.105  MDL settlement designers 
seeking closure may therefore include settlement terms designed to disrupt 
the market for legal services for claimants who wish to sue outside the 
settlement. 
A.  Lawyer Agreements Not to Sue 
Agreements that participating lawyers will not bring similar claims 
against the defendant in the future are an effective way to get the major 
players out of the business.  They make it harder for new claimants (or 
nonsettling claimants in search of new representation) to find a competent 
lawyer, and thus they promise the defendant some degree of closure.  But 
express agreements by lawyers not to bring future claims violate the ethical 
rules in most states as impermissible restrictions on the practice of law.106  
Therefore, MDL settlement designers have taken other approaches. 
Some MDL settlements require participating lawyers to affirm that they 
have “no present intention” of soliciting new clients with similar claims.107  
Because such provisions say nothing about what the lawyers’ intentions 
may become in the future and do not stop lawyers from taking clients who 
approach them, they do not appear to have any teeth.  But “no present 
intention” provisions may be a way for plaintiffs’ lawyers to signal to 
defendants that they are effectively out of the business.  Repeat-player 
lawyers may not want to develop a reputation for breaching such tacit 
understandings if they hope to be dealmakers in future MDLs.108 
Another alternative is for the defendant to retain major plaintiffs’ lawyers 
as consultants on the settlement’s implementation in an attempt to use the 
ethics rules to conflict them out of future representations.109  But several 
courts and bar associations have frowned on this approach,110 and, in any 
event, there may be too many plaintiffs’ lawyers who present credible 
threats to make such a strategy effective in an MDL. 
 
 104. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
 105. Nagareda, supra note 44, at 169. 
 106. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 13(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2000); 
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-371 (1993); Baker, supra 
note 83, at 1958. 
 107. E.g., Fosamax Settlement, supra note 15, § 77; AMS Settlement, supra note 20, 
§ IV.S. 
 108. See Baker, supra note 83, at 1960; Burch, supra note 7; Burch & Williams, supra 
note 7. 
 109. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 7, at 998–99; William H. Simon, The Market for Bad 
Legal Advice:  Academic Professional Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1555, 1580–81, app. II (2008). 
 110. See Baker, supra note 83, at 1959. 
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B.  Restrictions on Lawyer Advertising 
Although legal ethics rules bar lawyers from expressly agreeing not to 
bring future claims, some settlements, like the AMS mesh products 
settlement, have required participating lawyers to agree not to advertise for 
new clients with similar claims against the defendant.111  Restrictions on 
lawyer advertising add some teeth to “no present intention” provisions, and 
they hinder competition in the market for legal representation, making it 
harder for claimants dissatisfied with the settlement—and their own 
lawyers’ endorsement of it—to find new lawyers.  And advertising 
restrictions work in conjunction with lawyer-withdrawal provisions to 
encourage claimants to opt in to the global settlement.  If competing 
lawyers cannot advertise for new clients, dissatisfied claimants may not 
know that they have an alternative to opting in.112 
Of course, if barriers to entry are low, new lawyers not bound by the 
settlement agreement may enter the market and advertise aggressively for 
dissatisfied claimants.  But if barriers to entry are high, then restrictions on 
lawyer advertising can make lawyer-withdrawal provisions more coercive 
for clients. 
C.  Restrictions on Referral Fees 
Targeting the referral market is another way make it harder for 
dissatisfied claimants to find representation outside of the settlement.  The 
Vioxx settlement, for example, required participating lawyers to agree to 
forgo any financial interest in any eligible claim that did not opt in to the 
settlement.113  This meant that not only were lawyers prevented from 
representing nonsettling clients, but they also could not take referral fees for 
sending those clients to another lawyer. 
Requiring lawyers to forgo their financial interests in nonsettling claims 
does not directly affect the client’s decision calculus.  Indeed, it might even 
make it cheaper for the client to reject the settlement and sign on with a new 
lawyer because the previous lawyer would not be entitled to any share of 
the fees.  But it does create an incentive for the original lawyer to pressure 
the client to opt in to the settlement because that is the only way the lawyer 
can get paid for any work on behalf of that client. 
More importantly, the requirement that lawyers forgo any financial 
interest in nonsettling claims disrupts the referral market because the 
original lawyer has no financial incentive to help dissatisfied clients find 
new lawyers.  And, without referrals, dissatisfied claimants may have 
difficulty finding competent new lawyers to represent them outside of the 
settlement.  Therefore, settlement provisions that prevent lawyers from 
 
 111. AMS Settlement, supra note 20, § IV.S (“Claimants Counsel further represent that 
they will not actively solicit prospective Pelvic Mesh clients via television, radio, or website 
advertisement or other public or professional media outlets, either directly or indirectly 
through affiliates.”). 
 112. See Burch, supra note 7, at 93. 
 113. Vioxx Settlement, supra note 16, § 1.2.8.2. 
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taking referral fees for nonsettling clients reinforce lawyer-withdrawal 
provisions, making them more effective at achieving closure and more 
coercive from the clients’ point of view. 
CONCLUSION 
MDL dealmakers gravitate toward closure provisions because peace has 
value for defendants in mass litigation.  Lawyers who can deliver peace 
through a global settlement can demand a premium for their clients.  But 
the defendant’s willingness to pay for peace also creates a strategic dynamic 
where—unless there is some cramdown mechanism—holdouts can threaten 
to wreck the deal in an attempt to capture a premium for themselves. 
Closure provisions that prevent strategic holdouts benefit everyone—
claimants and defendants alike—as the defendant can put more money on 
the table, and the surplus can be allocated among the parties instead of 
siphoned off by strategic players.  But closure provisions that make it 
difficult for claimants with strong claims to protect themselves by refusing 
to participate in a global settlement create risks that the dealmakers—the 
defendant and the PSC—will exploit those claimants and appropriate the 
peace premium for themselves.  Ideal closure provisions would stop 
strategic players while protecting the ability of claimants who genuinely 
have strong claims to bargain for adequate compensation.  In other words, 
they would disfavor holdouts but protect “hold-ins.”114  The trick is trying 
to distinguish between the two, and that is not easy to do. 
Some closure provisions in MDL settlements have tried to target strategic 
behavior.  The DePuy good faith lawyer-expulsion provision and the BP 
sealed walk-away threshold, for example, appear to target strategic 
holdouts, while allowing claimants who have genuine problems with the 
settlement to refuse to participate.  To get those claimants to participate, the 
defendant will have to sweeten the deal and share a little bit more of the 
peace premium with claimants. 
The more troubling closure provisions impair the value of litigating 
claims outside of the settlement and alter the market for legal services so 
that no competing lawyer has sufficient incentives to challenge the deal.  A 
strong lawyer-recommendation provision reinforced by an inventory-
expulsion provision and a sophisticated lawyer-withdrawal provision 
coupled with barriers to competition or restrictions on referral fees, like 
those in the Vioxx settlement, present a significant risk that even claimants 
who are significantly undercompensated in the global settlement will have 
little choice but to go along with it. 
No publicly available MDL settlement since Vioxx has contained as 
sophisticated or as powerful a combination of closure provisions.  The 
closest imitator, the AMS mesh products settlement, had an ethical out in its 
 
 114. Some scholars refer to individuals who refuse to participate for genuine reasons as 
“hold-ins.” See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry:  
Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 128–29 (2004). 
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attorney-withdrawal provision and targeted only attorney advertising, not 
the referral market.115   
So did closure provisions make the Vioxx settlement a bad deal?  It is 
difficult to tell, as an outsider, how big the peace premium in any given 
case is and how much of it goes to claimants instead of being divided 
among the defendants and lawyers.  And there is no a priori reason to deny 
the defendant and negotiating lawyers a share of the peace premium.116  
After all, the bundlers who make peace possible need to share in the gains 
in order to incur the transaction costs of bundling.117  The $4.85 billion that 
Merck paid to settle the Vioxx claims is a lot of money.  But when not 
participating in the settlement is effectively no choice at all—and there is no 
other mechanism for claimants to voice their disapproval of the settlement 
(such as the ALI’s voting model)—we need to worry that the dealmakers 
may be doing more than simply pocketing the peace premium.  They may 
be exploiting claimants. 
The risk that MDL dealmakers may use closure provisions to foist an 
unattractive deal on claimants is not an argument against global settlements 
in MDLs.  It is not even an argument against the use of closure provisions 
in MDL settlements.  Closure may be a precondition to settlement, and 
closure provisions can be critical to disabling strategic holdouts.  But the 
potential for misuse of closure provisions may support MDL judges taking 
a more active role in supervising and evaluating the fairness of global 
settlements in even nonclass MDLs.  Given how hard it can be for 
claimants to tell a good deal from a bad one and the risks of lawyer 
disloyalty, the MDL judge—who, by the settlement phase, will often be 
intimately familiar with the details of the litigation—may be in the best 
position to tell whether the peace the settlement provides is worth the 
price.118 
As I have argued elsewhere, MDL judges do not need the formal power 
to reject a settlement (like a class action judge acting under Rule 23(e)) in 
order to weigh in publicly on the settlement’s fairness.119  The signal that 
the judge sends by expressing an opinion on the deal’s fairness is a 
powerful tool for getting information into the hands of claimants—
information that they need to evaluate their lawyers’ performance and 
loyalty.120  Because the success of an MDL settlement ultimately depends 
on obtaining buy-in from claimants, the MDL judge’s expressed skepticism 
toward the dealmakers’ choice of potent closure provisions without 
obtaining a sufficient premium for claimants in return may be enough to 
derail the settlement.  An MDL settlement—even one with closure 
 
 115. AMS Settlement, supra note 20, §§ IV.B, IV.I, IV.S. 
 116. See Robert G. Bone, Replacing Class Actions with Private ADR:  A Comment on 
“Settlement, ADR, and Class Action Superiority,” 5 J. TORT L. 127, 134 (2014) (“[T]he 
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 117. Rave, supra note 1, at 1216 n.122. 
 118. Bradt & Rave, supra note 12, at 7. 
 119. Id. at 7, 21, 32–35. 
 120. Id. at 28–32. 
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provisions—becomes a tough sell once the judge has publicly declared it 
unfair.  But for judges to play this role effectively, they need to understand 
how closure provisions work.  I hope this taxonomy helps them do that. 
